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Abstract. Game-theoretic analyses of distributed and peer-to-peer systems typ-
ically use the Nash equilibrium solution concept, but this explicitly excludes the
possibility of strategic behavior involving more than one agent. We examine the
effects of two types of strategic behavior involving more than one agent, sybils
and collusion, in the context of scrip systems where agents provide each other
with service in exchange for scrip. Sybils make an agent more likely to be chosen
to provide service, which generally makes it harder for agents without sybils to
earn money and decreases social welfare. Surprisingly, in certain circumstances
it is possible for sybils to make all agents better off. While collusion is generally
bad, in the context of scrip systems it actually tends to make all agents better
off, not merely those who collude. These results also provide insight into the ef-
fects of allowing agents to advertise and loan money. While many extensions of
Nash equilibrium have been proposed that address collusion and other issues rel-
evant to distributed and peer-to-peer systems, our results show that none of them
adequately address the issues raised by sybils and collusion in scrip systems.
1 Introduction
Studies of filesharing networks have shown that more than half of participants share
no files [2, 17]. Creating a currency with which users can get paid for the service they
provide gives users an incentive to contribute. Not surprisingly, scrip systems have often
been proposed to prevent such free-riding, as well as to address resource-allocation
problems more broadly. For example, KARMA used scrip to prevent free riding in P2P
networks [23] and Mirage [7] and Egg [6] use scrip to allocate resources in a wireless
sensor network testbed and a grid respectively
Chun et al. [22] studied user behavior in a deployed scrip system and observed
that users tried various (rational) manipulations of the auction mechanism used by the
system. Their observations suggest that system designers will have to deal with game-
theoretic concerns. Game-theoretic analyses of scrip systems (e.g., [3, 13, 16, 19]) have
focused on Nash equilibrium. However, because Nash equilibrium explicitly excludes
strategic behavior involving more than one agent, it cannot deal with many of the con-
cerns of systems designers. One obvious concern is collusion among sets of agents, but
there are more subtle concerns. In a P2P network, it is typically easy for an agent to
join the system under a number of different identities, and then mount what has been
called a sybil attack [11]. While these concerns are by now well understood, their im-
pact on a Nash equilibrium is not, although there has been some work on the effects of
multiple identities in auctions [25]. In this paper we examine the effects of sybils and
collusion on scrip systems. We show that if such strategic behavior is not taken into
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account, the performance of the system can be significantly degraded; indeed the scrip
system can fail in such a way that all agents even stop providing service entirely. Per-
haps more surprisingly, there are circumstances where sybils and collusion can improve
social welfare. Understanding the circumstances that lead to these different outcomes
is essential to the design of stable and efficient scrip systems.
In scrip systems where each new user is given an initial amount of scrip, there is
an obvious benefit to creating sybils. Even if this incentive is removed, sybils are still
useful: they can be used to increase the likelihood that an agent will be asked to provide
service, which makes it easier for him to earn money. This means that, in equilibrium,
those agents who have sybils will tend to spend less time without money and those who
do not will tend to spend more time without money, relative to the distribution of money
if no one had sybils. This increases the utility of sybilling agents at the expense of non-
sybilling agents. The overall effect is such that, if a large fraction of the agents have
sybils (even if each has only a few), agents without sybils typically will do poorly. From
the perspective of an agent considering creating sybils, the first few sybils can provide
him with a significant benefit, but the benefits of additional sybils rapidly diminish. So
if a designer can make sybilling moderately costly, the number of sybils actually created
by rational agents will usually be relatively small.
If a small fraction of agents have sybils, the situation is more subtle. Agents with
sybils still do better than those without, but the situation is not zero-sum. In particu-
lar, changes in the distribution of money can actually lead to a greater total number
of opportunities to earn money. This, in turn, can result in an increase in social wel-
fare: everyone is better off. However, exploiting this fact is generally not desirable. The
same process that leads to an improvement in social welfare can also lead to a crash of
the system, where all agents stop providing service. The system designer can achieve
the same effects by increasing the average amount of money or biasing the volunteer
selection process, so exploiting the possibility of sybils is generally not desirable.
Sybils create their effects by increasing the likelihood that an agent will be asked
to provide service; our analysis of them does not depend on why this increase occurs.
Thus, our analysis also applies to other factors that increase demand for an agent’s
services, such as advertising. In particular, our results suggest that there are tradeoffs
involved in allowing advertising. For example, many systems allow agents to announce
their connection speed and other similar factors. If this biases requests towards agents
with high connection speeds even when agents with lower connection speeds are per-
fectly capable of satisfying a particular request, then agents with low connection speeds
will have a significantly worse experience in the system. This also means that such
agents will have a strong incentive to lie about their connection speed.
While collusion in generally a bad thing, in the context of scrip systems with fixed
prices, it is almost entirely positive. Without collusion, if a user runs out of money he
is unable to request service until he is able to earn some. However, a colluding group
can pool there money so that all members can make a request whenever the group as
a whole has some money. This increases welfare for the agents who collude because
agents who have no money receive no service.
Furthermore, collusion tends to benefit the non-colluding agents as well. Since col-
luding agents work less often, it is easier for everyone to earn money, which ends up
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making everyone better off. However, as with sybils, collusion does have the potential
of crashing the system if the average amount of money is high.
While a designer should generally encourage collusion, we would expect that in
most systems there will be relatively little collusion and what collusion exists will in-
volve small numbers of agents. After all, scrip systems exist to try and resolve resource-
allocation problems where agents are competing with each other. If they could collude
to optimally allocate resources within the group, they would not need a scrip system
in the first place. However, many of the benefits of collusion come from agents being
allowed to effectively have a negative amount of money (by borrowing from their col-
lusive partners). These benefits could also be realized if agents are allowed to borrow
money, so designing a loan mechanism could be an important improvement for a scrip
system. Of course, implementing such a loan mechanism in a way that prevents abuse
requires a careful design.
These results about sybils and collusion indicate their role in scrip systems and
in distributed and peer-to-peer systems more broadly is poorly addressed by existing
solution concepts. We conclude by discussing some of the open questions they raise.
2 Model
Our model of a scrip system is essentially that of [19]. There are n agents in the system.
One agent can request a service which another agent can volunteer to fulfill. When a
service is performed by agent j for agent i, agent i derives some utility from having
that service performed, while agent j loses some utility for performing it. The amount
of utility gained by having a service performed and the amount lost by performing it
may depend on the agent. We assume that agents have a type t drawn from some finite
set T of types. We can describe the entire system using the tuple (T, f , n,m), where ft
is the fraction with type t, n is the total number of agents, and m is the average amount
of money per agent. In this paper, we consider only standard agents, whose type we
can characterize by a tuple t = (αt, βt, γt, δt, ρt, χt), where
– αt reflects the cost of satisfying a request;
– βt is the probability that the agent can satisfy a request
– γt measures the utility an agent gains for having a request satisfied;
– δt is the rate at which the agents discounts utility (so a unit of utility in k steps is
worth only δk/nt as much as a unit of utility now)—intuitively, δt is a measure of
an agent’s patience (the larger δt the more patient an agent is, since a unit of utility
tomorrow is worth almost as much as a unit today);
– ρt represents the (relative) request rate (since not all agents make requests at the same
rate)—intuitively, ρt characterizes an agent’s need for service; and
– χt represents the relative likelihood of being chosen to satisfy a request. This might
be because, for example, agents with better connection speeds are preferred.
The parameter χt did not appear in [19]; otherwise the definition of a type is identical
to that of [19].
We model the system as running for an infinite number of rounds. In each round,
an agent is picked with probability proportional to ρt to request service: a particular
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agent of type t is chosen with probability ρt/
∑
t′ ft′nρt′ . Receiving service costs some
amount of scrip that we normalize to $1. If the chosen agent does not have enough scrip,
nothing will happen in this round. Otherwise, each agent of type t is able to satisfy this
request with probability βt, independent of previous behavior. If at least one agent is
able and willing to satisfy the request, and the requester has type t′, then the requester
gets a benefit of γt′ utils (the job is done) and one of the volunteers is chosen at random
(weighted by the χt) to fulfill the request. If the chosen volunteer has type t, then that
agent loses αt utils, and receives a dollar as payment. The utility of all other agents
is unchanged in that round. The total utility of an agent is the discounted sum of the
agent’s round utilities. To model the fact that requests will happen more frequently the
more agents there are, we assume that the time between rounds is 1/n. This captures
the intuition that things are really happening in parallel and that adding more agents
should not change an agent’s request rate.
In our previous work [13, 19], we proved a number of results about this model:
– There is an (ǫ-) Nash equilibrium where each agent chooses a threshold k and vol-
unteers to work only when he has less than k dollars. For this equilibrium, an agent
needs no knowledge about other agents, as long as he knows how often he will make
a request and how often he will be chosen to work (both of which he can determine
empirically).
– Social welfare is essentially proportional to the average number of agents who have
money, which in turn is determined by the types of agents and the average amount of
money the agents in the system have.
– Social welfare increases as the average amount of money increases, up to a certain
point. Beyond that point, the system “crashes”: the only equilibrium is the trivial
equilibrium where all agents have threshold 0.
Our proofs of these results relied on the assumption that all types of agents shared
common values of β, χ, and ρ. To model sybils and collusion, we need to remove this
assumption. The purpose of the assumption was to make each agent equally likely to
be chosen at each step, which allows entropy to be used to determine the likelihood of
various outcomes, just as in statistical mechanics [18]. When the underlying distribu-
tion is no longer uniform, entropy is no longer sufficient to analyze the situation, but, as
we show here, relative entropy [9] (which can be viewed as a generalization of entropy
to allow non-uniform underlying distributions) can be used instead. The essential con-
nection is that where entropy can be interpreted as a measure of the number of ways a
distribution can be realized, relative entropy can be interpreted as a weighted measure
where some outcomes are more likely to be seen than others. While this connection
is well understood and has been used to derive similar results for independent random
variables [10], we believe that our application of the technique to a situation where the
underlying random variables are not independent is novel and perhaps of independent
interest. Using relative entropy, all our previous results can be extended to the general
case. The details of this extension are in the appendix.
This model does make a number of simplifying assumptions, but many can be re-
laxed without changing the fundamental behavior of the system (albeit at the cost of
greater strategic and analytic complexity). For example, rather than all requests having
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the same value γ, the value of a request might be stochastic. This would mean that an
agent may forgo a low-valued request if he is low on money. This fact may impact the
threshold he chooses and introduces new decisions about which requests to make, but
the overall behavior of the system will be essentially unchanged.
A more significant assumption is that prices are fixed. However, our results provide
insight even if we relax this assumption. With variable prices, the behavior of the sys-
tem depends on the value of β. For large β, where there are a significant number of
volunteers to satisfy most requests, we expect the resulting competition to effectively
produce a fixed price, so our analysis applies directly. For small β, where there are few
volunteers for each request, variable prices can have a significant impact. In particu-
lar, sybils and collusion are more likely to result in inflation or deflation rather than a
change in utility.
However, allowing prices to be set endogenously, by bidding, has a number of neg-
ative consequences. For one thing, it removes the ability of the system designer to opti-
mize the system using monetary policy. In addition, for small β, it makes it possible for
colluding agents to form a cartel to fix prices on a resource they control. It also greatly
increases the strategic complexity of using the system: rather than choosing a single
threshold, agents need an entire pricing scheme. Finally, the search costs and costs of
executing a transaction are likely to be higher with variable prices. Thus, in many cases
we believe that adopting a fixed price or a small set of fixed prices is a reasonable design
decision.
3 Sybils
Unless identities in a system are tied to a real world identity (for example by a credit
card), it is effectively impossible to prevent a single agent from having multiple iden-
tities [11]. Nevertheless, there are a number of techniques that can make it relatively
costly for an agent to do so. For example, Credence uses cryptographic puzzles to im-
pose a cost each time a new identity wishes to join the system [24]. Given that a de-
signer can impose moderate costs to sybilling, how much more need she worry about
the problem? In this section, we show that the gains from creating sybils when others
do not diminish rapidly, so modest costs may well be sufficient to deter sybilling by
typical users. However, sybilling is a self-reinforcing phenomenon. As the number of
agents with sybils gets larger, the cost to being a non-sybilling agent increases and so
the incentive to create sybils becomes stronger. Therefore measures to discourage or
prevent sybilling should be taken early before this reinforcing trend can start. Finally,
we examine the behavior of systems where only a small fraction of agents have sybils.
We show that under these circumstances a wide variety of outcomes are possible (even
when all agents are of a single type), ranging from a crash (where no service is pro-
vided) to an increase in social welfare. This analysis provides insight into the tradeoffs
between efficiency and stability that occur when controlling the money supply of the
system’s economy.
When an agent of type t creates sybils, he does not change anything about himself
but rather how other agents percieve him. Thus the only change to his type might be an
increase in χt if sybils cause other agents to choose him more often. We assume that
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each sybil is as likely to be chosen as the original agent, so creating s sybils increases χt
by sχt. (Sybils may have other impacts on the system, such as increased search costs,
but we expect these to be minor.) The amount of benefit he derives from this depends
on two probabilities: pe (the probability he will earn a dollar this round if he volunteers)
and ps (the probability he will be chosen to spend a dollar and there is another agent
willing and able to satisfy his request). When pe < ps, the agent has more opportunities
to spend money than to earn money, so he will regularly have requests go unsatisfied
due to a lack of money. In this case, the fraction of requests he has satisfied is roughly
pe/ps, so increasing pe results in a roughly linear increase in utility. When pe is close
to ps, the increase in satisfied requests is no longer linear, so the benefit of increasing
pe begins to diminish. Finally, when pe > ps, most of the agent’s requests are being
satisfied so the benefit from increasing pe is very small. Figure 1 illustrates an agent’s
utility as pe varies for ps = .0001.1 We formalize the relationship between pe, ps, and
utility in the following theorem.
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Fig. 1. The effect of pe on utility
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Fig. 2. The effect of sybils on utility
Theorem 1. Let ps be the probability that a particular agent is chosen to make a request
in a given round and there is some other agent willing and able to satisfy it, pe be the
probability that the agent earns a dollar given that he volunteers, r = pe/ps, and k be
the agent’s strategy (i.e., threshold). In the limit as the number of rounds goes to infinity,
the fraction of the agent’s requests that have an agent willing and able to satisfy them
that get satisfied is (r − rk+1)/(1− rk+1) if r 6= 1 and k/(k + 1) if r = 1.
Proof. Since we consider only requests that have another agent willing and able to sat-
isfy them, the request is satisfied whenever the agent has a non-zero amount of money.
1 Except where otherwise noted, this and other figures assume that m = 4, n = 10000 and
there is a single type of rational agent with α = .08, β = .01, γ = 1, δ = .97, ρ = 1, and
χ = 1. These values are chosen solely for illustration, and are representative of a broad range
of parameter values. The figures are based on calculations of the equilibrium behavior. The
algorithm used to find the equilibrium is described in [19].
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Since we have a fixed strategy and probabilities, consider the Markov chain whose states
are the amount of money the agent has and the transitions describe the probability of
the agent changing from one amount of money to another. This Markov chain satisfies
the requirements to have a stationary distribution and it can be easily verified that the
distribution gives the agent probability ri(1−r)/(1−rk+1) of having i dollars if r 6= 1
and probability 1/(k+1) if r = 1 [9]. This gives the probabilities given in the theorem.
Theorem 1 also gives insight into the equilibrium behavior with sybils. Clearly, if
sybils have no cost, then creating as many as possible is a dominant strategy. However,
in practice, we expect there is some modest overhead involved in creating and main-
taining a sybil, and that a designer can take steps to increase this cost without unduly
burdening agents. With such a cost, adding a sybil might be valuable if pe is much less
than ps, and a net loss otherwise. This makes sybils a self-reinforcing phenomenon.
When a large number of agents create sybils, agents with no sybils have their pe sig-
nificantly decreased. This makes them much worse off and makes sybils much more
attractive to them. Figure 2 shows an example of this effect. This self-reinforcing qual-
ity means it is important to take steps to discourage the use of sybils before they become
a problem. Luckily, Theorem 1 also suggests that a modest cost to create sybils will of-
ten be enough to prevent agents from creating them because with a well chosen value
of m, few agents should have low values of pe.
We have interpreted Figures 1 and 2 as being about changes in χ due to sybils,
but the results hold regardless of what caused differences in χ. For example, agents
may choose a volunteer based on characteristics such as connection speed or latency.
If these characteristics are difficult to verify and do impact decisions, our results show
that agents have a strong incentive to lie about them. This also suggests that the decision
about what sort of information the system should enable agents to share involves trade-
offs. If advertising legitimately allows agents to find better service or more services they
may be interested in, then advertising can increase social welfare. But if these character-
istics impact decisions but have little impact on the actual service, then allowing agents
to advertise them can lead to a situation like that in Figure 2, where some agents have a
significantly worse experience.
We have seen that when a large fraction of agents have sybils, those agents without
sybils tend to be starved of opportunities to work. However, as we saw in Figure 2,
when a small fraction of agents have sybils this effect (and its corresponding cost) is
small. Surprisingly, if there are few agents with sybils, an increase in the number of
sybils these agents have can actually result in a decrease of their effect on the other
agents. Because agents with sybils are more likely to be chosen to satisfy any particu-
lar request, they are able to use lower thresholds and reach those thresholds faster than
they would without sybils, so fewer are competing to satisfy any given request. Fur-
thermore, since agents with sybils can almost always pay to make a request, they can
provide more opportunities for other agents to satisfy requests and earn money. Social
welfare is essentially proportional to the number of satisfied requests (and is exactly
proportional to it if everyone shares the same values of α and γ), so a small number
of agents with a large number of sybils can improve social welfare, as Figure 3 shows.
Note that this is not necessarily a Pareto improvement. For the choice of parameters in
this example, social welfare increases when the agents create at least two sybils, but
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Fig. 3. Sybils can improve utility
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Fig. 4. Sybils can cause a crash
agents without sybils are worse off unless the agents with sybils create at least eight
sybils. As the number of agents with sybils increases, they are forced to start compet-
ing with each other for opportunities to earn money and so are forced to adopt higher
thresholds and this benefit disappears. This is what causes the discontinuity in Figure 2
when approximately a third of the agents have sybils.
This observation about the discontinuity also suggests another way to mitigate the
negative effects of sybils: increase the amount of money in the system. This effect can
be seen in Figure 4, where for m = 2 social welfare is very low with sybils but by
m = 4 it is higher than it would be without sybils.
Unfortunately, increasing the average amount of money has its own problems. Re-
call from Section 2 that, if the average amount of money per agent is too high, the
system will crash. It turns out that just a small number of agents creating sybils can
have the same effect, as Figure 4 shows. With no sybils, the point at which social wel-
fare stops increasing and the system crashes is between m = 10.25 and m = 10.5.
If one fifth of the agents each create a single sybil, the system crashes if m = 9.5, a
point where, without sybils, the social welfare was near optimal. Thus, if the system
designer tries to induce optimal behavior without taking sybils into account, the system
will crash. Moreover, because of the possibility of a crash, raising m to tolerate more
sybils is effective only if m was already set conservatively.
This example shows that there is a significant tradeoff between efficiency and sta-
bility. Setting the money supply high can increase social welfare, but at the price of
making the system less stable. Moreover, as the following theorem shows, whatever ef-
ficiencies can be achieved with sybils can be achieved without them, at least if there is
only one type of agent. The theorem does require a technical condition similar in spirit
to N -replica economies [21] to rule out transient equilibria that exist only for limited
values of n. In our results, we are interested in systems (T, f , n,m) where T , f , and m
are fixed, but n varies. This leads to a small technical problem: there are values of n for
which f cannot be the fraction of agents of each type nor can m be the average amount
of money (since, for example,m must be a multiple of 1/n). This technical concern can
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be remedied in a variety of ways; the approach we adopt is one used in the literature on
N -replica economies
Definition 1. A strategy profile k is an asymptotic equilibrium for a system (T, f , n,m)
if for all n′ such that n′ = cn for integer c > 0, k is a Nash equilibrium for
(T, f , n′,m).
Consider a system where all agents have the same type t. Suppose that some subset
of the agents have created sybils, and all the agents in the subset have created the same
number of sybils. We can model this by simply taking the agents in the subsets to have
a new type s, which is identical to t except that the value of χ increases. Thus, we state
our results in terms of systems with two types of agents, t and s.
Theorem 2. Suppose that t and s are two types that agree except for the value of χ,
and that χt < χs. If (kt, ks) is an asymptotic equilibrium for ({t, s}, f ,m) with social
welfare x, then there exists an m′ and n′ such that (ks) is an asymptotic equilibrium
for ({t}, {1}, n′,m′) with social welfare at least x.
Proof. We show this by finding an m′ such that agents in the second system that play
some strategy k get essentially the same utility that an agent with sybils would by play-
ing that strategy in the first system. Since ks was the optimal strategy for agents with
sybils in the first system, it must be optimal in the second system as well. Since agents
with sybils have greater utility than those without (they could always avoid volunteer-
ing some fraction of the time to effectively lower χs), social welfare will be at least as
high in the second system as in the first.
Once strategies are fixed, an agent’s utility depends only on αt, γt, δt, ps, and pe.
The first three are constants. Because the equilibrium is asymptotic, for sufficiently
large cn, almost every request by an agent with money is satisfied (the expected number
of agents wishing to volunteer is a constant fraction of cn). Therefore, ps is essentially
1/cn, his probability of being chosen to make a request. With fixed strategies, any
value of pe between 0 and βt can be achieved by taking the appropriate m′. Take m′
such that, if every agent in the second system plays ks, the resulting pe will be the same
as the agents with sybils had in the original equilibrium. Note that ps may decrease
slightly because fewer agents will be willing to volunteer, but we can take n′ = cn for
sufficiently large c to make this decrease arbitrarily small.
The analogous result for systems with more than one type of agent is not true. Con-
sider the situation shown in Figure 2, where forty percent of the agents have two sybils.
With this population, social welfare is lower than if no agents had sybils. However,
the same population could be interpreted simply as having two different types, one of
whom is naturally more likely to be chosen to satisfy a request. In this situation, if the
agents less likely to be chosen created exactly two sybils each, the each agent would
then be equally likely to be chosen and social welfare would increase. While chang-
ing m can change the relative quality of the two situations, a careful analysis of the
proof of Theorem 2 shows that, when each population is compared using its optimal
value of m, social welfare is greater with sybils. While situations like this show that
it is theoretically possible for sybils to increase social welfare beyond what is possible
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by adjusting the average amount of money, this outcome seems unlikely in practice. It
relies on agents creating just the right number of sybils. For situations where such a
precise use of sybils would lead to a significant increase in social welfare, a designer
could instead improve social welfare by biasing the algorithm agents use for selecting
which volunteer will satisfy the request.
4 Collusion
Agents that collude gain two major benefits. The primary benefit is that they can share
money, which simultaneously makes them less likely to run out of money and be unable
to make a request and allows them to pursue a joint strategy for determining when to
work. The secondary benefit, but important in particular for larger collusive groups,
is that they can satisfy each other’s requests. The effects of collusion on the rest of
the system depend crucially on whether agents are able to volunteer to satisfy requests
when they personally cannot satisfy the request but one of their colluding partners can.
In a system where a request is for computation, it seems relatively straightforward for
an agent to pass the computation to a partner to perform and then pass the answer
back to the requester. On the other hand, if a request is a piece of a file it seems less
plausible that an agent would accept a download from someone other than the person
he expects and it seems wasteful to have the chosen volunteer download it for the sole
purpose of immediately uploading it. If it is possible for colluders to pass off requests
in this fashion, they are able to effectively act as sybils for each other, with all the
consequences we discussed in Section 3. However, if agents can volunteer only for
requests they can personally satisfy, the effects of collusion are almost entirely positive.
Since we have already discussed the consequences of sybils, we will assume that
agents are able to volunteer only to satisfy requests that they personally can satisfy.
Furthermore, we make the simplifying assumption that agents that collude are of the
same type, because if agents of different types collude their strategic decisions become
more complicated. For example, once the colluding group has accumulated a certain
amount of money it may wish to have only members with small values of α volunteer
to satisfy requests. Or when it is low on money it may wish to deny use of money to
members with low values of γ. This results in strategies that involve sets of thresholds
rather than a single threshold, and while nothing seems fundamentally different about
the situation, it makes calculations significantly more difficult.
With these assumptions, we now examine how colluding agents will behave. Be-
cause colluding agents share money and types, it is irrelevant which members actually
perform work and have money. All that matters is the total amount of money the group
has. This means that when the group needs money, everyone in the group volunteers
for a job. Otherwise no one does. Thus, the group essentially acts like a single agent,
using a threshold which will be somewhat less than the sum of the thresholds that the
individual agents would have used, because it is less likely that c agents will make ck
requests in rapid succession than a single agent making k. Furthermore, some requests
will not require scrip at all because they can potentially be satisfied by other members
of the colluding group. When deciding whether the group should satisfy a member’s
request or ask for an outside volunteer to fulfill it, the group must decide whether it
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should pay a cost of α to avoid spending a dollar. Since not spending a dollar is effec-
tively the same as earning a dollar, the decision is already optimized by the threshold
strategy; the group should always attempt to satisfy a request internally unless it is in a
temporary situation where the group is above its threshold.
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Fig. 5. The effect of collusion on utility
Figure 5 shows an example of the effects of collusion on agents’ utilities as the size
of collusive groups increases. As this figure suggests, the effects typically go through
three phases. Initially, the fraction of requests colluders satisfy for each other is small.
This means that each collusive group must work for others to pay for almost every
request its members make. However, since they share money, the colluders do not have
to work as often as individuals would. Thus, other agents have more opportunity to
work, and every agent’s pe increases, making all agents better off.
As the number of colluders increases, the fraction of requests they satisfy internally
grows significant. We can think of ps as decreasing in this case, and view these requests
as being satisfied “outside” the scrip system because no scrip changes hands. This is
good for colluders, but is bad for other agents whose pe is lower since fewer requests
are being made. Even in this range, non-colluding agents still tend to be better off
than if there were no colluders because the overall competition for opportunities to
work is still lower. Finally, once the collusive group is large enough, it will have a
low ps relative to pe. This means the collusive group can use a very low threshold
which again begins improving utility for all agents. The equivalent situation with sybils
was transitory and disappeared when more agents created sybils. However, this low
threshold is an inherent consequence of colluders satisfying each other’s requests, and
so persists and even increases as the amount of collusion in the system increases. Since
collusion is difficult to maintain (the problem of incentivizing agents to contribute is
the whole point of using scrip), we would expect the size of collusive groups seen in
practice to be relatively small. Therefore, we expect that for most systems collusion will
be Pareto improving. Note that, as with sybils, this decreased competition can also lead
to a crash. However, if the system designer is monitoring the system and encouraging
and expecting collusion she can reduce m appropriately and prevent a crash.
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These results also suggest that creating the ability to take out loans (with an ap-
propriate interest rate) is likely to be beneficial. Loans gain the benefits of reduced
competition without the accompanying cost of fewer requests being made in the sys-
tem. However, implementing a loan mechanism requires addressing a number of other
incentive problems. For example, whitewashing, where agents take on a new identity
(in this case to escape debts) needs to be prevented [14].
5 Conclusion
We have seen that sybils are generally bad for social welfare in scrip systems, and that
where they are beneficial the same results can be achieved without sybils by increasing
the amount of money or biasing volunteer selection in the system. On the other hand,
collusion tends to be a net benefit and should be encouraged. Indeed, the entire purpose
of the system is to allow users to collude and provide each other with service despite
incentives to free ride. Beyond the context of scrip systems, these results raise questions
about game-theoretic analysis of distributed and peer-to-peer systems more generally.
Many solution concepts that consider joint strategic behavior have been proposed.
Solution concepts that require that no collusive group have an incentive to deviate,
such as strong Nash equilibrium [4] and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium [5], are well
known. More recently, the possibility that colluding agents might be malicious or sim-
ply behave in an unpredictable fashion has been considered. k-fault tolerant Nash equi-
librium requires that a each agent’s strategy is still optimal even if up to k agents behave
in an arbitrary fashion [12]. The BAR model has three types of agents: Byzantine, ratio-
nal, and obedient “altruistic” agents who will follow the given protocol even if it is not
rational [8, 20]. (k, t)-robustness combines both these directions with the possibility
that k agents may behave arbitrarily and t agents may collude [1].
The possibility of creating sybils has received significantly less attention and is more
unique to distributed and peer-to-peer systems. Sybils can have a tremendous impact on
the efficiency of the system and understanding the incentives involved in creating them
is crucial to managing them appropriately. Finding a solution concept that accounts for
sybils in a rigorous fashion is still an open question.
Collusion is beneficial for most scrip systems, but in a way that is poorly suited for
most solution concepts that address it. Existing solution concepts look for strategies that
remain stable in the presence of collusion. For example, k−t robustness allows t agents
to collude and then requires that other agents have no incentive to change their strategy.
Our results have shown that agents do have an incentive to change their strategies in
response, which means that no equilibrium exists according to these solution concepts.
While the particular equilibrium strategies change, scrip systems are still stable (and
in fact improved) in the presence of collusion. Existing solution concepts that address
collusion are inadequate in cases where collusion is beneficial.
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A Using Relative Entropy
Our previous results showed the existence of equilibria in a simple class of strategy
called threshold strategies. The threshold strategy Sk is the strategy where an agent
volunteers if and only if his current amount of money is less than k. This class of
strategies is attractive for several reasons. From the perspective of an agent, it makes
his decisions simple; he requires no complicated computation or state to determine
whether to volunteer. It is also quite natural. If an agent is feeling poor (less than k)
he will want to work to earn money. If an agent feels rich (at least k) he would rather
defer the costs associated with working into the future. From the perspective of the
design and analysis of scrip systems, these strategies are nice because they require little
information to determine what will happen. An agent’s decision is determined solely by
his threshold and current amount of money. This allows for straightforward evaluation
of the evolution of the system as a Markov chain and of agent’s strategic decisions as a
Markov decision process (MDP).
Our theoretical results follow from three key facts about the Markov Chain and
MDP:
1. The Markov chain that describes the system has a “well behaved” limit distribution
when all agents play threshold strategies (Lemma 3.1 of [19]).
2. There is a distribution of money d∗ (the fraction of agents with each amount of
money) such that, after some initial period, the observed distribution of money in
the system will almost always be “close” to d∗ (Theorem 3.1 of [19]).
3. If some agents raise their thresholds and all other agents keep their thresholds un-
changed then the new distribution d+ will have at least as large a fraction with zero
dollars and at most as large a fraction at their threshold amount of money as d∗
(Lemma 3.2 of [19]).
Once we abandon the assumption of payoff heterogeneity, these facts remain true,
but we have to modify our arguments for them. First, the limit distribution is still well
behaved. Suppose agent i is twice as likely to spend money as agent j and consider two
states which are identical except that in one agent i has one dollar and agent j has none
and while in the other the situation is reversed. Since agent i spends money faster once
he gets it, we would expect it would be less likely to see him holding a dollar than agent
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j. In fact, the second state turns out to be exactly twice as likely as the first. Using this
observation we can build a simple weighting of the relative likelihood of states based
on the division of money among agents (see Lemma 1).
The next fact is that the distribution of money in the system will almost always be
close to a particular distribution d∗. This type of clustering about the most likely dis-
tribution is common in statistical physics (for example the arrangement of molecules
of a gas in a closed container), where it is known as a concentration phenomenon [18].
Because each possible arrangement is equally likely, the observed outcomes are con-
centrated around the distribution that maximizes entropy. Our states are not equally
likely, but we do have a weighting that captures the relative likelihoods. We can use
this weighing through a generalization of entropy known as relative entropy [9]. The
relative entropy can be thought of as a distance measure for distributions. For distribu-
tions p and q, the relative entropy is D(p || q) =
∑
x p(x) log(p(x)/q(x)). Finding the
distribution that maximizes entropy is a special case of relative entropy: it is the distri-
bution that minimizes relative entropy relative to the uniform distribution. The d∗ we
want is the distribution the minimizes relative entropy relative to a distribution based
on the limit distribution of the Markov chain. The formula for this distribution is given
by Lemma 2 and the argument that there is a concentration phenomenon for it is the
subject of Lemma 3. The importance of relative entropy to concentration phenomena
is examined in much greater generality by Csisza´r [10]. However, those results cover
independent random variables that are made dependent by constraints (for example a
series of tosses of a biased coin with the constraint that at least 75 percent were heads).
We believe our application of the technique to the amounts of money agents have, which
are not independent, is novel and perhaps of independent interest.
The final fact involves using this formula to show that this distribution has natural
monotonicity properties: if some agents increase their threshold, then there will be more
agents with no money and fewer agents at their threshold. Intuitively, this is because
more of those agents will want to work at any given time so money is harder to earn.
When money is harder to earn but agents want to spend as often, agents will find it
harder to reach their threshold amount of money and spend more time with no money.
This intuition is formalized in Lemma 4.
These lemmas are sufficient to generalize our previous results. In particular, this
means
– when all agents use threshold strategies, each has an (ǫ-) best response that is a thresh-
old strategy;
– these best responses are non-decreasing in the strategies of the other agents; and as a
consequence
– (ǫ-) Nash equilibria exist where all agents play threshold strategies and there are
efficient algorithms to find them.
For more details on how these results follow from the lemmas as well as formal
statements of them, see [19].
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B Technical Appendix
Lemma 1. For all states x of the Markov chain whose states are allocations of money
to agents consistent with agent strategies k and whose transition probabilities are de-
termined by k and (T, f , n,m), let wx =
∏
i(βiχi/ρi)
xi
, and let Z =
∑
y wy . Then
the limit distribution of the Markov chain is πx = wx/Z .
Proof. If Sxy is the probability of transitioning from state x to state y, it is sufficient
to show that πxSxy = πySyx for all states x and y and that the πx are non-negative
and
∑
x πx = 1. The latter two conditions follow immediately from the definitions of
wx and Z . To check the first condition, let x and y be adjacent states such that y is
reached from x by i spending a dollar and j earning a dollar. This means that for Sxy
to happen, i must be chosen to spend a dollar and j must be able to work and chosen
to earn the dollar. Similarly for Syx to happen, j must be chosen to spend a dollar and
i must be able to work and chosen to earn the dollar. All other agents have the same
amount of money in each state, and so will make the same decision in each state. Thus
the probabilities associated with each transition differ only in the relative likelihoods of
i and j being chosen at each point. To be more precise, for some p (which captures the
actions of the other agents), Sxy = ρiβjχjp and Syx = ρjβiχip. Also note that since x
and y differ only by i having a dollar in x and j having it is y, πx = (βiχiρj/ρiβjχj)πy .
Combining these facts gives:
πxSxy = (
βiχiρj
ρiβjχj
πy)(
ρiβjχj
ρjβiχi
Syx) = πySyx.
Note that Lemma 3.1 of [19] which assumes payoff heterogeneity is now a simple
special case of Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. Under the assumption of payoff heterogeneity (βi = β, χi = χ, and
ρi = ρ for all i), the limit distribution is the uniform distribution.
Proof. wx = (βχ/ρ)mn for all x, so the limit distribution is the uniform distribution.
To make use of our understanding of the limit distribution from Lemma 1, we define
a distribution q and a distribution M∗
f ,m that minimizes entropy relative to it, subject to
certain constraints.
Definition 2. Given a system (T, f , n,m) where agents play strategies k, let ωt =
βtχt/ρt for each type t. Let q be the probability distribution on agent types t and
amounts of money i
qti = (ωt)
i / (
∑
t
kt∑
j=0
(ωt)
j).
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Definition 3. Given a system (T, f , n,m) where agents play strategies k, M∗ is the
distribution that minimizes relative entropy D(M∗||q) subject to the constraints
kt∑
j=0
(M∗)tj = ft and
∑
t
kt∑
j=0
j(M∗)tj = m.
Lemma 2.
(M∗)ti =
ftλ
iqti∑kt
j=0 λ
jqtj
,
where λ is chosen so that the second constraint of Definition 3 is satisfied.
The proof of Lemma 2 is omitted because it can be easily checked using Lagrange
multipliers in the manner of [18].
Lemma 3. Given a system (T, f , cn,m) where agents play strategies k, let M(τ) be
the random variable that gives the distribution of money in the system at time τ , and let
M∗ be defined as in Definition 3. Then for all ǫ, there exists nǫ such that, if n > nǫ,
there exists a time τ∗ such that for all times τ > τ∗
Pr(||M(τ) −M∗||2 > ǫ) < ǫ.
Note that ||·||2 is the 2-norm, which we use for convenience as a measure of distance
between distributions.
Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that after a sufficient amount of time the probability
of being in state x will be close to πx = wx/z. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that
the statement holds in the limit as τ → ∞, because if we bound the probability of
distributions being far apart in the limit by ǫ′ < ǫ, we can take tau large enough that
the additional noise from using only a finite number of steps of the Markov chain is
bounded by ǫ − ǫ′. If M(x) is the distribution of money in state x, then we need to
show that the set of x such that ||M(x) −M∗||2 ≥ ǫ has total probability in the limit
distribution of less than ǫ for sufficiently large n.
Let Df ,m,cn,k be the set of distributions achievable given f , m, cn, and k and let
d ∈ Df ,m,cn,k. More precisely dti is the fraction of agents of type t with i dollars. There
may be many states x that have a distribution of money d. We know from [13] that
the number of such states is proportional to ecnH(d), where H is the standard entropy
function. Each of these states has the same probability wd,cn/zcn, so the probability of
seeing any particular distribution is proportional to ecnH(d)wd,cn/zcn. First, we show
that the distribution that maximizes this quantity is the distribution M∗ from Defini-
tion 3 that minimizes relative entropy.
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argmax
d
ecnH(d)wd,cn = argmax
d
ecnH(d)
∏
t
kt∏
i=0
ω
cnidt
i
t
= argmax
d
ecnH(d)
∏
t
kt∏
i=0
ecnid
t
i
logωt
= argmax
d
H(d) +
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
idti logωt
= argmax
d
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[−dti log d
t
i + id
t
i logωt]
= argmax
d
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[−dti log d
t
i + d
t
i log q
t
i ]
= argmin
d
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[dti log d
t
i − d
t
i log q
t
i ]
= argmin
d
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
dti log
dti
qti
= argmin
d
D(d||q).
Because all d ∈ Df ,m,cn,k have the property that dticn is an integer for all i and
t, M∗ may not be an element of Df ,m,cn,k. However, for sufficiently large cn we can
find a d arbitrarily close to it. For a particular cn, take M∗ and round each value to
the nearest 1/cn. However, the resulting d may have some t for which
∑kt
i=0 d
t
i 6= ft.
This can be fixed by creating a new d by adding or subtracting 1/cn from each dti
as appropriate until these constraints are satisfied (for definiteness, we start with dt0 for
each t and then proceed in ascending order of i until the constraint for that t is satisfied).
However, this may still leave the constraint that the average amount of money is m
unsatisfied. Again, this can be fixed by slightly adjusting the dti , in this case by moving
agents from dti to dti−1 to subtract money or to dti+1 to add money (for definiteness,
we start by moving agents downwards from dtkt until it reaches 0 in which case we
proceed to dtkt−1 if we need to remove money and similarly from d
t
0 if we need to add
money). Our final distance ||d −M∗||2 has each term change by at most 1/cn in the
first step, 1/cn in the second step, and
∑
t
∑kt
i=0 2i/cn in the final step (this last is a
bound on how much money could be created or lost by the changes). This means each
term changes by at most (2|T |(maxt kt) + 2)/cn, which is O(1/cn). Thus for a large
enough nǫ, the resulting d will always be within distance ǫ of M∗.
The remainder of the proof is essentially that of Theorem 3.13 in [15] (though ap-
plied to a different type of constraint). Let vmax be the maximum value of H(d) +∑
t
∑kt
i=0 id
t
i logωt at a point in satisfying the constraints, which we know occurs at
p = M∗. We show that there exists a vl such that every point not within distance ǫ of p,
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the value is at most vl. Then we show that there is a point in Df ,m,cn,k near p that has
value vh > vl.
The set of points that for some n are in Df ,m,cn,k and are of distance strictly less
than ǫ is an open set. Therefore its complement is a closed set. Since this set is closed,
there is a point pl where the value is maximized in this set. Take the value at that point
to be vl. Since entropy is continuous, our function is continuous. Therefore, there is
some ǫ′ and vh such that all points within distance ǫ′ of p have value at least vh > vl.
The construction of d above allows us find such a point ph.
To complete the proof, we use the fact shown in the proof of Lemma 3.11 of [15]
that for any d ∈ Df ,m,cn,k,
1
f(cn)
ecnH(d) ≤
(
cn
cndt10 , . . . , cnd
t1
kt1
, cndt20 , . . .
)
≤ g(cn)ecnH(d),
where f and g are polynomial in cn. We know that there is some point ph at which the
value is vh. There is at least as much total weight near p as there is weight at ph, so the
total weight near p is at least
1
f(cn)zcn
ecnvh .
The total weight at each point of distance at least ǫ is at most
g(cn)
zcn
ecnvl .
There are at most (cn+ 1)
P
t
kt points, so the total “bad” weight is at most
h(cn)
zcn
ecnvl ,
where h(cn) = g(cn)(cn + 1)
P
t
kt
, which is still polynomial in n. Thus the fraction
of “bad” weight is
h(cn)
zcn
ecnvl
1
f(cn)zcn
ecnvh
=
f(cn)h(cn)
ecn(vh−vl)
.
This is the ratio of a polynomial to an exponential, so the probability of seeing a distri-
bution of distance greater than ǫ from M∗ goes to zero as n goes to infinity.
As before, Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 of [19], which assume payoff heterogene-
ity, are a special case of Lemma 3.
Corollary 2. Given a payoff-heterogeneous system with cn agents where a fraction πk
of agents plays strategy Sk and the average amount of money is m, let Mpi,n,m(t) be
the the random variable that gives the distribution of money in the system at time t, and
let M∗
pi,m be the distribution that maximizes entropy subject to the constraints imposed
by m and pi. Then for all ǫ, there exists nǫ such that, if n > nǫ, there exists a time t∗
such that for all t > t∗,
Pr(||Mpi,cn,m(t)−M
∗
pi,m||2 > ǫ) < ǫ.
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Furthermore, (M∗
pi,m)
k
i = πkλ
i/
∑k
j=0 λ
j where λ is chosen to ensure that the con-
straint imposed by m is satisfied.
Proof. ωt has the same value ω for all types t. Replacing λ by ωλ in the formula forM∗
gives a formula equivalent to Lemma 2. Note that there we were maximizing entropy
and here we are minimizing relative entropy, but the two are equivalent because when
q is the uniform distribution D(p||q) = z −H(p) where z is a constant [9].
Lemma 4. Let M0 =
∑
t(M
∗)t0 and let Mk =
∑
t(M
∗)tkt (the fraction of agents
with no money and at their threshold respectively). Suppose each type of agent changes
strategy from kt to k′t such that k′t ≥ kt for all t. Then M ′0 ≥M0 and M ′k ≤Mk.
Proof. Since we have a finite set of types, it suffices to consider the case where a sin-
gle type t∗ increases its strategy by 1. First, we will show that after the change λ has
decreased. Suppose that it remained unchanged. From the formula in Lemma 2, (M∗)ti
for t 6= t∗ would be unchanged. For t∗, the terms (M∗)t∗0 to (M∗)t
∗
kt∗
will decrease
because there is a new term in the divisor and the sum of the decreases appears as a
new term (M∗)t
∗
kt∗
+ 1. This means that the total amount of money in the system has
increased. Since the total amount of money is unchanged, λ must decrease.
From the formula, it immediately follows that M ′0 ≥ M0 because the numerator
of each term is effectively unchanged and the denominator has decreased (the qti have
changed, but the changes cancel out since the change is to the constant by which each
is divided). For t 6= t∗, the derivative of (M∗)tkt relative to λ is negative, so those terms
of M ′k have decreased.
Finally, we need to show that (M∗)tkt ≥ ((M
′)∗)tkt+1. Suppose otherwise. Then
we have
((M ′)∗)tkt =
((M ′)∗)tkt+1
λ′ωt
>
((M ′)∗)tkt+1
λωt
>
(M∗)tkt
λωt
> (M∗)tkt−1.
More generally, this means that (M∗)ti > ((M ′)∗)ti−1. But this would mean that∑kt+1
i=0 ((M
′)∗)ti > ft, which violates a constraint.
